Just War Theory and Explosive
Remnants of War
For centuries, philosophers and political theorists have pondered the ethical considerations of waging war. Just War theory, expounded upon by contemporary thinkers,
addresses three ethical components of war-making: the conditions for going to war, acceptable violence during combat, and the eventual resolution and remediation of conflict.
These issues and their overlap with humanitarian demining and small arms/light weapons
control are examined below.
by Eric Patterson, Ph.D. [ Georgetown University ]
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or the better part of two millennia, churchmen,
scholars, jurists, soldiers and statesmen have turned
to Just War theory for guidance in making ethical
decisions about war. Indeed, Just War concepts permeate
international law and the laws of armed conflict; it is from
the Just War tradition that we get the principles of proportionality, noncombatant immunity, and the idea that
legitimate authorities (i.e., governments) should have a
monopoly on the use of force.
As the readers of this journal tend to be concerned
with moving beyond the destructiveness of the conflict
cycle, it is appropriate to ask, “Does Just War theory have
something to say about our efforts to mitigate the threat
to human life and property from explosive remnants of
war,1 as well as illicit military-style small arms and light
weapons?” The answer is yes: Just War theory informs our
views of weapons in or out of the hands of legitimate authorities, about the ethics of how war is conducted and
about the post-conflict context.
Essential Just War Theory
In its strict form, Just War theory provides policy and
moral guidance on two issues: under what conditions it
is moral to go to war (jus ad bellum) and how violence
can be morally employed during war (jus in bello). Early
Just War theorists, such as Thomas Aquinas, argued that
the principled decision to use military force was based on
three criteria: sovereign authority acting on a just cause
with right intent. Over time, new factors—what James
Turner Johnson has aptly called “additional prudential
criteria”—were added to the trio: likelihood of success,
proportionality of ends and last resort. 2
In addition to the criteria governing the resort to
force, jus in bello suggests that wars should be waged
with restraint, using means and tactics proportionate
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to battlefield objectives (proportionality) that limit harm
to civilians (discrimination or noncombatant immunity). Finally, it should be noted that a handful of contemporary authors argue that we should consider the moral
context of how wars end (jus post bellum), which is an appropriate focus for practitioners who concern themselves
with the detritus of violence in the aftermath of war.
Just War’s Questions and Action Against ERW
The issue of legitimate authority. One of the interstices between explosive remnants of war and illicit small
arms/light weapons and the Just War tradition concerns
legitimate authority. Just War theory begins with the
question, “Under what conditions is it just to go to war?”
One of the answers provided by Augustine of Hippo (St.
Augustine) and Aquinas is that, in general, legitimate authorities—we call them governments today—are the only
agents that can justifiably use force. Of course, Just War
theory has traditionally accepted individual self-defense,
as well as communal self-defense in unique cases such as
genocide. Nevertheless, generally speaking, for Just War
theory, government authorities are the only legitimate
purveyors of force. This premise has obvious ramifications
for the issues related to conventional weapons and explosives in the developing world, such as stockpiled mines,
ordnance and SA/LW.
A concern that many of us share is the over-abundance of military-style SA/LW and other conventional
weapons of war that are either poorly secured or beyond the control of government authorities in developing countries. Of course, we are not talking about
such items as sporting or hunting rif les, which citizens legally own in accordance with national laws,
but rather the remnants of war such as the millions
of Warsaw Pact weapons that made their way to Af-
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rica through the gray and black markets during the
1990s or the tons of explosives looted from Saddam
Hussein’s arsenal.
These weapons, moving clandestinely across porous
borders in the hands of criminals and terrorists, exacerbate
conditions of insecurity and hamper good governance
by legitimate governments. Likewise, the availability of
explosive material, from landmines or other sources, has
provided the components for improvised explosive devices.
Fragile, post-conflict governments can be hamstrung in
their efforts to develop economically and agriculturally
if their lands are contaminated by unexploded ordnance
or mines. The point is that a rightly ordered, or just,
society presupposes conditions of security guaranteed

by legitimate authorities, but that such a guarantee is often beyond the abilities of
modern post-conflict institutions, which are limited further by poorly trained police,
unpaid soldiers, newborn judiciaries and fledgling civilian-government agencies.
The issue of noncombatant immunity. Just War theory asks a second question:
“Assuming that the decision to fight a war has been made, how can battle be conducted in a way that is moral?” One element of Just War theory that answers this question
is the principle of discrimination—distinguishing authorized military agents of states
(e.g., soldiers and sailors) from civilians. This principle is often called noncombatant
immunity, which has historically included women, children, the wounded, the elderly
and the like.
The problems we have seen in the past decade that are directly related to illicit SA/
LW include rebel armies purchasing arms on the black market, illicit weapons ending up in the hands of child soldiers, and poorly secured national stockpiles being
pilfered by criminals. Insidiously, terrorists often target civilians as “soft targets” for
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excess and obsolete SA/LW, and has provided over US$1.3 billion to humanitarian mine
action in the past two decades. Governments
such as Japan, Canada and members of the
European Union likewise contribute in order
to promote the conditions for such security to
take root.
The reason Just War theory has endured
through the vicissitudes of Western history
is because it bridges our moral ideals with
the realities of a world characterized by
self-interested—and often violent—power
politics. What many do not realize is that
Just War theory underlies many of our
assumptions in the West, such as those
governing proportionality and noncombatant
immunity. Perhaps of equal importance is
that it provides a rationale for what we can do
to promote security around the world.
See Endnotes Page 111
For additional references for this article,
please visit http://tinyurl.com/krcvum.

With financial assistance from the U.S. State Department, Senegal has successfully collected and destroyed more than
4,000 small arms, including MAS-36 submachine guns and MAT-49 rifles.

This Falklands-Malvinas Islands minefield is a sanctuary for penguins. The birds’ ground-bearing pressure is insufficient to set off the mines, and their predators are too big to
enter the minefield.
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suicide bombings to cause both mass casualties and widespread panic. Again, the point is
that criminals and insurgents are turning a tool
necessary for national defense on those who are
unsuspecting and unarmed. Sadly, legacy landmines—some of which have been in the ground
for decades—do not discriminate between warriors and innocents, making them an additional passive, yet deadly disruptor of prosperity.
The issue of ending war well. Finally, I believe that recent on Just War Theory completed
by Bian Orend, Michael Water, and myself, poses a third question: “What does an ethical end to
war look like?” Certainly in the past decade, we
have seen strides toward more just and durable peace agreements than ever before, such as
demobilization, disarmament and reintegration3 efforts, South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, prosecutorial attempts
against warmongers like Slobodan Milosevic,
reconciliation processes and the like. An important component of DDR is those processes
by which the national government asserts control over the military hardware it dispensed
during the conflict. Government authorities
should collect these items, professionalize the
forces handling the weapons, safely and securely stockpile them, and destroy the excess
and obsolete items from their stocks, lest they
become tools for renewed conflict.
When it comes to landmines and associated ERW, establishing long-term conditions
of peace means stewardship of land resources, including reclamation of transport links,
water points and farmland from contamina-

tion. This process is “ending well”: moving
beyond the conditions from which conflict
commenced. Furthermore, it is more often the
case that such issues are seen as regional and
international inhibitors to peace, so international partnerships with foreign governments
or nongovernmental organizations provide
necessary assistance to ameliorate the legacies
of conflict. This is jus post bellum.
Pragmatic International Security
This article has demonstrated that some of
the ways we think about the destructive legacies of war, such as ERW and the proliferation
of illicit SA/LW, have roots in venerable Just
War theory; however, the Just War tradition
should not be thought of as merely an academic exercise. It marries real-world pragmatism
with our hopes for security and justice.
Elsewhere I have argued that jus post
bellum—post-conflict law, or ending war
well—begins with political order and sometimes moves beyond mere order to justice. In
a handful of instances, reconciliation can be
the result. 3 That is the goal many of us hope
for when the hot war ends; however, without a durable sociopolitical order—from basic safety to confidence that the land can be
tilled and water can be drawn safely to assure that the weapons of war have been safely
stored—such security is but a fantasy. Consequently, the efforts of major governments and
nongovernmental actors in this regard are
critical. For example, the U.S. State Department funds efforts to secure and/or destroy
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Clearing the Falkland-Malvinas Islands
Under pressure from nations around the world and in compliance with Article 5, the U.K. has committed to
demining the Falkland-Malvinas Islands, despite the potential cost of demining in a relatively mine-safe1 area.
by Robert Keeley [ RK Consulting Ltd. ]

W

hile the news of the United Kingdom’s decision, under
global pressure, to begin demining the Falkland-Malvinas
Islands does show a commitment to holding countries to
the agreements set up by Article 5 of the Ottawa Convention, 2,3 the location and situation of the landmines in discussion raise the question:
Is demanding that the Falkland-Malvinas Islands be cleared a triumph
in international diplomacy or a break with common sense? There are
five distinct points that need to be made about this decision.
Cost of Demining
The Falkland-Malvinas Islands clearance process will be very
expensive. First of all, the existing mines are laid mainly on the beaches
and in soft ground. The result is that the mines may move in the peat
and may be affected by the tides, complicating the process. Although a
completed feasibility study shows that clearance may be possible, there are
clear implications for cost. The recent U.K./Argentina feasibility study,
of which the main element was a field survey conducted by Cranfield
University, concludes that mine clearance in the Falkland-Malvinas
Islands is possible but will present significant technical challenges and
risks, which include risks related to possible environmental impact.4
While the feasibility study suggests that it is possible to grade
the problem into degrees of complexity, the report does not identify costs (nor are there significant benefits against which these costs

should be compared). The problem caused by this absolutist position is
that we cannot now say that the British government can clear the easiest
of these four categories and leave the hardest. To be Article 5-compliant,
the British government has to clear them all, thus negating much of the
benefit of this useful study.
No Casualties in Over 20 Years
These mines pose a minimal threat to the Falkland-Malvinas
Islands. There have been no civilian casualties since 1982, 5 and there is
little demand for the contaminated land. The Islanders themselves have
been very vocal in asking the British government to spend its money elsewhere. Mike Summers, a member of the legislative council of the Falkland-Malvinas Islands government, echoes this sentiment, saying, “There
are a lot of mines in the Falklands, but they are not that intrusive. Clearly
there is an issue about clearance, but unless they are cleared 110 percent,
we are not going to take the fences down anyway. If that can be done, then
fine. If the British government was to invest money in clearing mines,
then we would be more than happy for them to invest it in other countries.
Our needs are not as pressing as other people’s.”5 He goes on to say, “That
doesn’t mean that in the fullness of time we don’t want it done. But we
would feel somewhat embarrassed if the British government spent money
clearing mines in the Falklands if there was an opportunity to spend it in
some other territory where there are children and adults at risk.”5
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